The Maguindanao Murders: Two Perspectives (Part 2)

Notes on the Maguindanao Massacre

These are comments written by Eric Gutierrez, author of The Ties That Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth Congress (Manila: PCIJ, 1994). Eric spent a lot of time in Mindanao conducting research for that book and is one of the most knowledgeable people on political clans in the Philippines.

1. Old vs. New

News reports have framed this massacre as warfare between competing political clans. But it is also important to qualify this as deadly competition coming to a head between old royalty and a new, emerging and successful political clan. The Ampatuans are an old, long-established clan, one of few that claims lineage to Sharif Kabungsuan and are therefore regarded as ‘royalty’ in the greater Cotabato region. According to popular myth, Islam was established in the Rio Grande by Sharif Kabungsuan, whose father is an Arab and mother is the daughter of the Sultan of Johore in Malaysia (the Sultans in Malaysia, in turn, claim lineage to the prophet Mohammad). Kabungsuan married some of his converts and founded the Maguindanao sultanate. A complex system of ranking developed from this legend. The sultans, who claim direct descent, typically enjoy higher esteem and ranking. The other ‘royal’ clans in the valley include the Sinsuats and the Masturas. But there are also other ‘nobles’ — rajahs and datus — who while also claiming some form of descent had proved themselves by consolidating their own political and economic power. The Mangudadatus seem to be part of this group of newly-emergent ‘lower’ nobles. What makes them most successful is that they have started to carve out their own political territory out of the current boundaries of Maguindanao and also in Sultan Kudarat, which is predominantly Christian-dominated. My speculation is that the Ampatuans look down on the Mangudadatus as upstarts or ‘probinsiyanos’ from the hinterlands of Cotabato who are now threatening the consolidation of the Ampatuans’ hold of and attempt to monopolize formal state power in what they consider as their private turf.

In the last elections, the current governor Andal Ampatuan Sr ran unopposed. Andal Junior wants to repeat this feat when he runs for his father’s post next year. So Andal Jr warned the Mangudadatus that they won’t even be able to file certificates of candidacy, because the documents need to be brought to the Comelec offices in Sharif Aguak town, which is Ampatuan country. The Ampatuans can do this “lawfully”, simply by putting up checkpoints manned by policemen loyal to the family, who will then disarm any private group entering the town. Rather than risk entering Sharif Aguak unarmed, what Esmael Mangudadatu did was to send his wife — accompanied by women lawyers, other women relatives, and the media — to file his certificate of candidacy. They underestimated the hatred and capacity for violence of the Ampatuans.

2. Unequalled, perhaps, but not unprecedented

Presidential adviser Jess Dureza has been quoted as saying this massacre of civilians is unequalled in recent history. Again, I suggest some qualifications to this statement. Civilian massacres, unfortunately, are common in Cotabato politics. In its troubled history, there have been cycles of violence in the Cotabato region — massacres perpetrated by settlers, locals, Christian, Muslim, etc. What happened may be unequalled in the sense that at least a dozen media persons were victims.

The beheadings and mutilations are also not unprecedented. In fact, the Cotabato region has seen some of the most gruesome acts of violence. Cotabato is after all, the land of the Ilagas and the Barracudas. Kumander Toothpick, a Tiruray who organised the Ilaga after his family was massacred by Maguindanaos identified with the Sinsuats, honed to perfection the art of terrorizing enemies — he cut off ears (to keep as souvenirs) and ate the livers of the Muslims he killed in combat, in the belief that this would give him supernatural powers. In response, Maguindanao politicians formed their own “Barracudas”. The most famous Ilaga figure today is Norberto Manero. It wouldn’t surprise me if some of those involved in the attack on the Mangudadatus were Barracudas.

I am underscoring these gruesome acts to emphasize how violence is essential in keeping and projecting power in the Cotabato region. Manero became a legend and such a powerful figure who can terrorise his enemies because he did the most gruesome acts — like eating the brain of the murdered Italian priest Tullio Favali. Andal Jr seems to be following that path. Andal Jr and his followers may be charged in court, even convicted and jailed. But like Manero, he will continue to strike terror in the hearts of his family’s opponents even when he is jailed. I bet he will also be able to do spectacular capers like what Manero has done — Manero should have an entry in Ripley’s as the only convicted criminal to have gained an audience with two presidents and even shook hands with one (Arroyo), even when he is supposedly locked up in a maximum security prison.

3. Privatised state

I have always asked if the state and its institutions really exist in its proper form in the Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan areas. Many years ago, I interviewed mayors who happen to keep civil registries (birth, marriage, death) and even land registries in their private households. They reasoned that that the safest way to keep those public records is to keep them in their houses, which are typically small fortresses in the capital towns, where the mayor is more secure. There are mayors in the Cotabato region who don’t even set foot in their municipalities, either because the MILF controls that area, or because political opponents are too powerful that they can attack the town hall any time. I think that normal or fully-functional local governments in many of these areas are a myth. What emerges is a privatised state, a privatised bureaucracy, a privatised local government.

I don’t believe Dureza’s call to impose a state of emergency to disarm the various groups will work, for the simple reason that — who will do the disarming? The police can’t do it, because the loyalties of the its members are suspect. The military may be given the job, but they are already stretched out by the war vs the MILF, and besides, they need to keep local strongmen like Andal Jr and Mangudadatu as their allies. A regional force perhaps? I remember a military checkpoint outside Cotabato City, where soldiers stopped a politician’s convoy from entering the city. The soldiers were outnumbered and outgunned, and simply could not enforce that thing called rule of law. The bottom line is, there is no simple, short-term solution to this problem.

 

 

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